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I. Introduction 
The relationship between liberalism and religion has received insufficient 
attention.1 To be sure much literature has explored the role that liberalism would afford 
religion in democratic life.2 But it has been too often assumed that there is only one 
liberalism and that liberalism and religion are inevitable adversaries.3 Actually there are 
many liberalisms with many different attitudes toward religion. Moreover these different 
liberalisms bring different assumptions to the most basic constitutional questions 
involving the Religion Clauses. 
Of course, liberalism favors freedom of religion and separation of church and state, at least 
in the abstract. But different liberalisms have different understandings of what these concepts 
mean and why they should be supported. For example, with respect to the free exercise of 
 
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. This paper grows out of a presentation at the Central Meeting of the 
American Philosophical Association in Chicago and a plenary address to the Conference on Philosophy and 
the Social Sciences in Prague. I am grateful to those who made comments at these events and to those who 
have commented on the manuscript. I have particularly benefited from questions or comments by Ed Baker, 
Rick Garnett, Kent Greenawalt, Trevor Morrison, Seana Shiffrin, and Brad Wendel. 
1 By liberalism, I mean broadly to include those on the left side of the political spectrum including many 
who would identify as radicals. The left is famous for its ability to engage in combat over political 
differences. My aim here is to explore those differences regarding the relationship between religion and the 
state. I do not include those radicals who are opposed to freedom of religion. I do not include libertarians  
who in the nineteenth century would be classified as liberals. Most of them ally themselves with the 
Republican party; some might form alliances with the left, but they are not on the left. In that sense, they 
are like Vatican Catholics, neither reliably on the left or right of the political spectrum, but forced to decide 
which candidate provides more than half a loaf.  
2 I believe the political aspects of that subject need somewhat more discussion. See text accompanying 
notes 79-119 infra.
3 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE 
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 60 (1993)(referring to the “instinctive mistrust of God-talk by contemporary 
liberals”); Paul J. Weithman, Introduction: Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect, in  PAUL J. 
WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 1, 1 (1997)(“It is a shibboleth of contemporary 
political analysis that religion and liberalism are mutually antagonistic”). 
2religion, Employment Division v. Smith4 held that generally applicable statutes that burden 
religion are constitutional5 unless they were intended to burden religion6 or burden other 
constitutional rights as well.7 There is room for some liberals to agree with Smith,8 but most do 
not.9 In any event, they do not remotely agree on how to think about the case. Moreover the 
strength of their commitments to freedom of religion varies considerably. 
With respect to the establishment of religion, McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties 
Union of Kentucky,10 presented the question whether the placement of large copies of abridged 
texts of the Commandments in two Kentucky county courthouses11 violated the Establishment 
Clause.12 A companion case, Van Orden v. Perry,13 presented the same question regarding the 
display of a 6 feet high and 3 ½ feet wide monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capital.14 
In McCreary, the Court, emphasizing the religious purpose embedded in the events leading 
up to the placement, struck down the display on a 5 to 4 vote.15 In Van Orden, the Court upheld 
the display on a 5 to 4 vote.16 Liberals would uniformly oppose the government display in both of 
 
4 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
5 Id. at 890. 
6 Id. at 877-88.  
7 Id. at 881-82. 
8 BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY 321 (2001)(“There is no principle of justice mandating 
exemptions to generally applicable laws for those who find compliance burdensome in virtue of their 
cultural norms or religious beliefs.”). Although Barry supports Smith (id. at 320-21), he might permit 
exemptions on the basis of prudence or generosity. Id. at 38-39. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith 
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.CHI.L.REV. 308 (1991). For a response to Marshall by a leading 
religious conservative, see Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U.CHI.L. REV.
329 (1991). 
9 Most supporters of Smith relied on conservative constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, 
Beguiled; Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L.REV. 245, 248 
(1991)(defending Smith by looking to the understanding of the free exercise clause in the years 1789-91). 
Liberal groups, both religious and non-religious overwhelmingly opposed the outcome in Smith. Id. at 246.  
10 125 S.Ct 2722 (2005). 
11 Id. at 2728. 
12 Id. at 2745. 
13 125 S.Ct. 2854 (2005). 
14 Id. at 2858.  
15 125 S.Ct. at 2737-41, 2745. 
16 125 S.Ct. at 2864; 125 S.Ct. at 2871-72 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer provided the crucial fifth 
vote. He thought the display was primarily non-religious. Id. at 2871. 
3the Ten Commandments cases,17 but would again vary in reasons for their position.18 As I shall 
argue, these differences have significant implications for American politics. 
 Although the left reaches similar conclusions about the government’s use of religious 
symbols through different though overlapping paths, the left is substantively divided (sometimes 
in surprising ways) concerning the important issue of aid to religious organizations such as 
schools and charities.  
In understanding these differences, I think it is helpful to think about the role that 
attitudes toward religion play in the construction of political theory. In clarifying the relationship 
between liberalism and religion, I distinguish between five types of liberalism, four of them 
secular, one of them religious. I proceed to discuss how the various liberalisms relate to the 
Religion Clauses. My goal, however, ranges beyond taxonomy. I proceed to argue that religious 
liberalism is better equipped to engage or combat religious conservatism than is secular 
liberalism. This, I believe, is an important political contention, but not a general philosophical 
critique of secular liberalism. I will suggest, however, that much of what has been said about the 
relationship between religion and democracy is not only bad politics, but bad philosophy. The bad 
politics concerns me the most. It obscures or gets in the way of the vital role religious liberalism 
can play in combating injustice.  
 
II. The Liberal Families 
 Each of the liberal families I describe is committed to free exercise of religion and the 
separation of church and state (otherwise, they would not be liberal). They are distinguished by 
 
17 One prominent conservative judge has pointed to the Ten Commandments cases as an example of the 
Court’s turn to “split the difference” jurisprudence (J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: 
The Lures and Perils of Split-The-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L.REV. 1969, 1973-74 (2006), a 
phenomenon he speculated may have been influenced by a reaction to the criticism of Bush v. Gore. Id. at 
1971.  
18 They would share an opposition to favoring some religions over others. For defense of this principle, see 
Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, The Ten Commandments, and 
the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW.U.L.REV. 1097, 1097-1103, 1117-21 (2006); Steven H. 
Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.REV. 9, 64-76 (2004). 
4their attitudes toward religion.  More specifically, they are distinguished by the role that religion 
plays or does not play in the grounding of their public approach to defending liberalism. I do not 
propose to trace the views of individual liberals. The families I describe are more like ideal types, 
and they are not exhaustive.  At least, they serve to illustrate that liberal views are compatible 
with a range of attitudes toward religion. 
A. The Five Families Described 
With respect to religion, liberalisms might be hostile, indifferent, mixed, cooperative, or 
favorable. Hostile or anti-religious liberalism is sometimes hostile to religion generally or to 
supernaturalism; it is generally hostile to organized religion. Indeed, it tends to define itself 
against religion.  It proceeds from the view that institutional religion has a disreputable record of 
oppression, persecution, and violence. Hostile religion most readily finds a home in themes that 
found vigorous expression in the French Enlightenment.19 The Enlightenment arose from an 
antipathy to what it perceived to be blind adherence to authority, tradition, custom, habit, and 
faith.20 It valorized reason, independent thought, autonomy, and scientific method.21 
Representatives of this strand of liberalism might be Voltaire,22 John Dewey,23 Alan Ryan,24 and 
 
19 “Liberalism is par excellence the doctrine of the Enlightenment. Brian Barry, How Not to Defend Liberal 
Institutions, 20 B.J.POL.S. 1, 2 (1990). On the hostility of much of the Enlightenment to religion, the 
subtitle of Peter Gay’s classic tells it all, PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION, THE 
RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM (1966). See also id. at xi: The philosophes’ rebellion was a “paganism directed 
against their Christian inheritance and dependent upon the paganism of classical antiquity, but it was also a 
modern paganism, emancipated from classical thought as from Christian dogma.” 
20 Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of  Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 456 (1996)(“The lasting accomplishment of the 
Enlightenment, then, was its development of an epistemological method. That method was a repudiation of 
the ‘millennium of superstition, other worldliness, mysticism, and dogma know as the Middle, or Dark, 
Ages.’”), quoting RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 21 (1993). 
21 “A . . . notable aspect of the Enlightenment thought is the emergence of a scientific way of thinking . . . .” 
JAMES M. BYRNE, RELIGION AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 10 (1996). 
22 Voltaire’s “secular philosophy was a formidable, almost irresistible rival of Christianity.” PETER GAY,
THE PARTY OF HUMANITY 5 (1964). For Voltaire, the “church was the implacable enemy of progress, 
decency, humanity, and rationality.” Id.at 44. See Byrne, supra note 21, at 2 (Voltaire’s criticism of 
Christianity and the church weakened the power of religion in French cultural life). On the other hand, 
Voltaire thought that it might be a good thing for the masses to remain religious despite his contempt for 
the religion they held.  FRANK E. MANUEL, THE CHANGING OF THE GODS 66 (Hanover: Brown University 
Press, 1983). 
23 Dewey did not object to God talk, but he rejected any concept of the supernatural. ALAN RYAN, JOHN 
DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 273 (1995). 
5Richard Rorty.25 
Closely related, indifferent liberalism also highlights the importance of reason, 
independent thought, and autonomy, but defends liberalism without resort to anti-religious 
premises. In other word, if religion did not exist, indifferent liberalism’s methods of justification 
would largely be unaffected. Ronald Dworkin26 and Joseph Raz,27 belong in this category.  
 Cooperative liberalism in part stems from a concern about the deep divisions flowing 
from religion.28 It regards the pluralism of society as a challenge and an opportunity. It argues 
that liberalism might be grounded in a variety of possible comprehensive positions including 
those that are Kantian, Millian, or religious.  The point of cooperative liberalism is that those of 
secular and religious views would engage in a system of fair cooperation that respected the 
different views that others hold.  At least with respect to constitutional essentials and issues of 
basic justice, cooperative liberals would argue from secular premises29 that could appeal to those 
who fit into an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive views. John Rawls in 
 
24 Id. at 274 (referring to himself as an “aggressive atheist”). 
25 Richard Rorty, “Anticlericalism and Atheism,” in RICHARD RORTY & GIANNI VATTIMO, THE FUTURE OF 
RELIGION 40-41 n.2 (2005)(expressing the hope that institutionalized religion will eventually disappear); 
Richard Rorty, “Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration,” 31 JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
141, 142 (accord). 
26 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 281-84 (2000); 
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
(1977).  I do not think Dworkin is generally hostile or favorable to religion in RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S
DOMINION (1993). He argues that the right to procreative autonomy should be protected under the religion 
clauses (id. at 160-68), and he argues that the question whether to abort is morally serious (id. at 68-101), 
but he does not make remarks for or against religion generally. He does indicate that government could 
encourage women to take the question of the sanctity of life seriously (id. at 168), and he suggests that the 
question of the sanctity of life is an essentially religious question. Id. at 163-64. One might argue that the 
latter commits him to a favorable view of religion (at least in this narrow area), but he recognizes that a 
belief in the sanctity of life could follow from traditional religion or from a belief in a godless nature that is 
not “conventionally religious”. Id. at 82. And he argues that it is no business of the state to settle on one 
account or another. Id. at 160-68. 
27 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
28 “In Political Liberalism and recent essays, the story Rawls tells us is that political liberalism [what I call 
cooperative liberalism] emerges out of the conflicts between opposing moral doctrines, specifically the 
early modern wars of religion and the debates about religious tolerance.” James Bohman, Public Reason 
and Cultural Pluralism, 23 POLITICAL THEORY 253, 253 (1995). 
29 Secular premises of comprehensive views would be excluded unless they were shared among other 
reasonable comprehensive views. 
6Political Liberalism is the leader of this liberal family.30 Stephen Macedo31 also seems to qualify 
as a member.32 That Rawls designates some religions as “unreasonable”33 and that Macedo would 
actively discourage some religions34 should not blur the fact that their form of liberalism is 
designed to encourage cooperation between religions and non-religious perspectives that can 
commit to arriving at fair terms for a just society. 
Mixed liberalism includes a number of attitudes toward religion that do not fit into the 
other secular families. In other words, different stories could be told about the role of religion in 
history before leading to some form of secular liberalism, eg., it had and has oppressive and 
liberating humane aspects; eg., it was useful, but it has outlived its usefulness; e.g., it continues to 
be useful in terms of having influenced modern humane values, but it is unrealistic. John Stuart 
Mill probably best fits into this category.35
Although the four other families of liberalism justify conclusions from secular 
premises,36 Favorable liberalism reaches liberal conclusions from religious premises. Although it 
respects other comprehensive visions, it has a more expansive conception of the role of religion in 
 
30 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996). 
31 STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST : CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 
169 (2000) (view about public reason is consistent with what Rawls advocates). 
32 It is possible that Martha Nussbaum belongs here as well. She explicitly identifies with political 
liberalism (Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in Susan Muller Okin with respondents, Is 
Multiculturalism Bad For Women? 105, 109-110 (Joshua Cohen, Mathew Howard, & Martha C. 
Nussbaum, eds., 1999) emphasizes the importance of respecting other comprehensive positions (id. at 109), 
and states that her comprehensive own vision as a Kantian reform Jew would not justify eliminating sex 
discrimination in the choice of Catholic priest or in abrogating various Jewish positions on sex equality (id. 
at 114) even though she repudiates the Catholic discrimination and the positions held by many Jews id.).
But she might, consistent with the views she has stated, have a far more expansive conception of the role of 
religion in democratic life than Rawls. If she did, I would classify her as a favorable liberal. 
33 On the definition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, see Rawls, supra note 30, at 59. For explication 
of the reasonableness requirement, see Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic 
Comment, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 389, 399-405 (2000). Rawls’s conception of the reasonable has been 
carefully criticized. Onora O’Neill, Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 106 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 411 (1997). 
34 STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED., at 85 
(impact of the content of public schools wisely makes it harder for some religions to perpetuate their 
views). 
35 In particular, see John Stuart Mill, Utility of Religion, in JOHN STUART MILL, NATURE AND UTILITY OF 
RELIGION 50-51 (1958)(belief in supernatural once served useful purposes, but was now dispensable). For 
commentary, see LINDA C. RAEDER, JOHN STUART MILL AND THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY (2002). 
36 Those cooperative liberals who are religious, nonetheless, justify their conclusions in terms that can be 
shared by other reasonable forms of liberalism. This excludes religious reasons. 
7democratic life than is entertained by Cooperative liberals. Favorable liberalism might be 
represented by John Locke37 or, in more modern times, Michael Lerner,38 Joan Chittister,39 
Dorothy Day,40 Richard Rohr,41 and in many respects Jim Wallis42 and Ronald J. Sider.43 It might 
also include Martin Luther King,44 liberation theology,45 and much of African American religious 
thought.46 It could include much of Catholic social thought,47 and dissenting Catholic moral 
theologians like Charles Curran.48 The paucity of professional philosophers in the ranks of 
favorable liberalism seems conspicuous. But religious premises ground the thinking of millions of 
 
37 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro 
ed., 2003). For discussion of the depth of the religious foundations of Locke, see JEREMY WALDRON, GOD,
LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).  
38 MICHAEL LERNER, THE LEFT HAND OF GOD: TAKING BACK OUR COUNTRY FROM THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 
(2006). 
39 JOAN CHITTISTER, IN THE HEART OF THE TEMPLE (2004). 
40 DOROTHY DAY: SELECTED WRITINGS xv (Robert Ellsberg, ed., 1998)(Dorothy Day “wrote to give reason 
for a marriage of convictions that was a scandal and a stumbling block to many: radical politics and 
traditional, conservative theology”); see also MEL PIEHL, BREAKING BREAD: THE CATHOLIC WORKER AND 
THE ORIGIN OF CATHOLIC RADICALISM IN AMERICA (2006). 
41 RICHARD ROHR & JOHN BOOKSER FEISTER, HOPE AGAINST DARKNESS: THE TRANSFORMING VISION OF 
SAINT FRANCIS IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY (2001); RICHARD ROHR & JOHN BOOKSER FEISTER, JESUS' PLAN 
FOR A NEW WORLD: THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT (   ). 
42 JIM WALLIS, GOD’S POLITICS: WHY THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG AND THE LEFT DOESN’T GET IT (2005). 
43 RONALD J. SIDER, RICH CHRISTIANS IN AN AGE OF HUNGER (2oth anniv. Rev. (1997). 
44 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT (2000); STEWART BURNS, TO THE MOUNTAINTOP:
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.'S MISSION TO SAVE AMERICA: 1955-1968 (2005); TAYLOR BRANCH, AT
CANAAN'S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1965-68 (2006); TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE :
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 (1999); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS : AMERICA IN THE 
KING YEARS 1954-63 (1989); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive 
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990).  
45 GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND SALVATION (1988); 
LEONARDO BUFF, SAINT FRANCIS: A MODEL FOR HUMAN LIBERATION (John W. Diercksmeier, trans., 
1982). Religious liberalism, as I use the term, may include political radicals as well. My usage is thus 
somewhat broader than that of Paul Rasor (see FAITH WITHOUT CERTAINTY: LIBERAL THEOLOGY IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 141-63 (2005), but his book is an outstanding introduction to liberal theology. 
46 AFRICAN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT : AN ANTHOLOGY (Cornell West & Eddie S. Glaude eds., 
2003); MICHAEL JOSEPH BROWN, BLACKENING OF THE BIBLE: THE AIMS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN BIBLICAL 
SCHOLARSHIP (2004 ).  
47 Among other things, Catholic social teaching is concerned about the economic injustice associated with 
poverty and ill treatment of workers. OPTION FOR THE POOR: A HUNDRED YEARS OF VATICAN SOCIAL 
TEACHING  (Donald Dorr, ed., 1992); CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (Jean 
Vanier, ed., 1992); MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 
(Anthony T. Padovano, ed., 2005); MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING : COMMENTARIES AND 
INTERPRETATIONS (Kenneth R. Himes & Lisa Sowle Cahill, eds., [et al.], 2005). Of course, concern for the 
poor is common among ministers of virtually all denominations. ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE CRISIS IN THE 
CHURCHES: SPIRITUAL MALAISE, FISCAL WOE 207 (2006), but the involvement of churches  does not 
match the need. Id. at 208. 
48 For an excellent introduction to his thought, see A CALL TO FIDELITY: ON THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF 
CHARLES E. CURRAN (Samuel Koranteng-Pipim, ed., D.C.2002). 
8citizens regarding liberal attitudes on civil rights, distributive justice, moral limits regarding war, 
and duties owed to the natural environment. They also ground the case for religious liberty and 
separation of church and state. 
A note of emphasis: It is the nature of the secular or religious grounding of the family of 
liberalism that distinguishes the five families. Although I have designated the hostile, indifferent, 
mixed, and cooperative families as secular, a religious person could belong to any of these four 
secular families. To take the most obvious case first, by definition a religious person could be a 
cooperative liberal.49 Second, a religious person could be an indifferent liberal who believes that 
liberalism should be justified on secular grounds. One’s religion might embrace the view that 
religious premises should not directly provide a justification for actions that would coerce non-
religious citizens. The concept of a religious neo-Kantian is not oxymoronic.50 Third, a religious 
person could be a hostile liberal who believes that institutional religion is harmful and that 
liberalism should be justified on secular grounds; finally, a mixed liberal might have positive or 
even mixed views about his or her own religion, and mixed views about other religions. That 
liberal too might believe in a public secular grounding for political conclusions. 
The hostile, indifferent, mixed, and cooperative families are secular not because you 
must be an atheist or an agnostic to belong, but because the public justification of liberalism is 
secular. Favorable liberalism is favorable because the public grounding for liberalism is religious. 
The category of favorable liberalism could itself be subdivided. Not all favorable liberals are 
alike. Rather than negotiate that terrain, I will employ the term “religious liberalism” to designate 
what I consider to be the best form of favorable liberalism though I will refer to open questions 
within religious liberalism as well.  
B. Liberals and Religion Clause Issues 
 
49 Favorable liberals, unlike cooperative liberals do not accept the limits of public reason held by Rawls. 
For an intriguing account of why a Catholic should be a cooperative liberal, see Leslie Griffin, Good 
Catholics Should be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S.CAL.INTERDISC.L.J. 297 (1997). 
50 Although she is not an indifferent liberal, Martha Nussbaum is a religious Kantian. See note 32 supra. 
9How would the various families of liberalism approach the questions of government use 
of religious symbols, government aid to religious organizations, and freedom of religion? Do the 
ways in which they approach the issues vary from family to family? Government display of 
religious symbols would draw opposition from each of the five families, and they would agree on 
at least a part of the rationale. They would argue that the religion of citizens or the lack of it 
should have no bearing on their relationship to the state.51 They should not be marked as insiders 
or outsiders.52 To place a crèche in a building that is supposed to stand for the impartial state53 or 
to erect a religious monument on state capital grounds is to accord a privileged status to 
Christianity in the case of the crèche and to Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the case of the Ten 
Commandments. As we shall see, the case against these displays need not be confined to respect 
for equality, but liberals do share that respect. 
The question of state aid to religious organizations is perhaps the most significant other 
issue involving the relationship between church and the state. Most secular liberals would 
oppose vouchers and funding for so-called faith based organizations that discriminate on 
the basis of religion with respect to their clients or their employees or that use funds to 
present a religious message. Sometime liberals argue that it is wrong to force taxpayer to 
 
51 Justice O’Connor’s theoretical commitments in this area were generally liberal: “The Establishment 
Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s 
standing in the religious community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
52 Id. at 688 (repudiating endorsement because it sends a message to some that they are insiders and to 
others that they are outsiders). Regrettably the endorsement test was, for the most part, ignored in the Ten 
Commandments cases. Greg Abbott, Upholding the Unbroken Tradition: Constitutional Acknowledgement 
of the Ten Commandments in the Public Square, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. JR. 51, 54-55 (2005). For 
criticism of the endorsement approach, see Jesse Choper, The Endorsement Test: Itys Status and 
Desirability, 18 J.OF L.&POLITICS 499 (2002); Stephen D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal 
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L.REV. 266 (1987); William 
P. Marshall, “We Know it When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.CAL.L.REV. 495 
(1986). For a modest modification of the endorsement test that speaks to some of the criticisms, see B. 
Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 
MICH. L.REV. 491, 539-544 (2005). For an even more ambitious discussion of the concerns that have been 
addressed by the endorsement test proposing a shift in focus, see Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires 
From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 Sup.Ct. Rev. 135, 192 (2005)(focusing on the 
“strategic deployment of religious symbols” influencing religious demographics).   
53 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989)(striking down the display of a crèche in a 
county courthouse). 
10
fund religious views to which they are opposed.54 Nonetheless, it is hard to understand 
why funding religion is special. Taxpayers are routinely forced to support ideologies and 
programs to which they are opposed, even programs to which they have serious moral 
objections, e.g., wars. Indeed, if the concern about supporting religious organization was 
really based in protecting the conscience of taxpayers, the solution would be refunds, not 
a constitutional prohibition. On the other hand, in many, perhaps most, circumstances, 
there may be a substantive equality concern that one religion in particular is benefiting 
from the subsidy program55 or a concern that the schools or charities are not doing a good 
job.56 But neither of these objections, however well founded, are theoretical objections to 
the funding. They depend upon the facts on the ground though the interpretation of those 
facts may be influenced by one’s attitudes toward religion.57 In this connection, even 
favorable liberals might be concerned about vouchers. A favorable liberal may justify 
liberal conclusions from religious premises, but think that government aid to religious 
organizations will predominantly favor those whose ideologies are bad for children and 
 
54 James Madison is the father of this argument. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in James Madison: Writings 31 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). The 
applicability of Madison’s argument to vouchers has been resisted. Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly 
Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 375 (1999); 
Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (2002). 
55 This was a concern in the landmark case of Zelmon v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)(upholding 
Cleveland’s voucher program despite the fact that 96% of the voucher students attended Catholic schools). 
56 This issue raises a dilemma. Either schools and religious organizations are not held accountable or they 
are held accountable and subject to potentially intrusive regulation leading to worrisome entanglement 
issues. 
57 Another important view of many liberals is that public education is to be preferred on the ground that it 
brings people of all races, classes, and religions and that a diverse student body promotes many important 
values including autonomy, empathy, respect, tolerance, social skills, and capacity for democratic 
deliberation. See generally, Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Socialization of Children: 
Compulsory Public Education and Vouchers, 11 CORNELL J. LAW & SOC. POL’Y 503, 514-23 (2002). This 
argument may have special attraction to perfectionist liberals or cooperative liberals (whose perfectionism 
is limited to developing skills and attitudes for participation in democratic life), but it depends upon the 
facts on the ground as well. 
11
the common good.58 Moreover, as we shall see, religious liberals have additional bases 
for concern about financial aid to religious organizations though they might well support 
such aid in particular contexts. 
Liberals who support aid might do so for either or both of two considerations. 
First, the state offers secular education for free; an egalitarian could argue that this stacks 
the deck in favor of one perspective over another. Second, secular liberals have historic 
commitments to distributive justice. They might in a non-ideal world weigh the benefits 
to the poor of voucher funding or funding to faith based organizations and conclude that 
those benefits outweigh the concrete harm flowing from the infringement on the principle 
of separating church from state.  To be sure, perhaps most secular liberals like to believe 
that the principle of separation of church and state should not be subject to utilitarian 
balancing and that faith-based organizations should not receive a dime of federal or state 
funds. But when liberals consider that Catholic, Jewish, and Lutheran organizations have 
received and continue to receive billions of dollars of government money to distribute to 
the poor, that they do not proselytize or discriminate on the basis of religion regarding 
their clients or employees, and that the poor would be significantly damaged if these 
sources of funding were taken away, most secular liberals are prepared to lower the high 
wall separating church and state.59 
Less clear is the reaction of liberals to the Smith case. Although the overwhelming 
majority of liberals would protect religious liberty in Smith, some might not. Secular liberals 
generally favor free exercise of religion without thinking religion is special. Secular liberals 
 
58 
59 There is a spectrum of charitable activities. At one end, it would be the rare liberal that would oppose the 
use of vouchers for medical care at a religious hospital. At the other end would be schools that are in the 
business of religious socialization. In between are a range of activities including soup kitchens and 
adoption agencies. 
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generally believe that the state should be neutral toward most conceptions of the good life.60 
Religion would be protected under this view, not because it was in any way special, but because it 
was a conception of the good life.61 This has implications regarding the question of religious 
exemptions from non-discriminatory laws or accommodations with respect to burdens on the 
exercise of religion not otherwise required under the Constitution. Such exemptions or 
accommodations from this perspective would generally be problematic on equality grounds.62 
One can imagine a hostile liberal contending that religion deserves no special treatment, that the 
burden on religion occurred as the result of a generally applicable law, and that if a religious 
person violates the law, he or she should accept the consequences.63 Indeed, John Locke, a 
favorable liberal, maintained that the magistrates acted within their authority when they enacted 
generally applicable laws burdening religious practice.64
Nonetheless, liberals are largely opposed to the Smith decision, and the grounds are 
various. One possibility is to recognize that in some cases the affording of religious exemptions 
might be necessary in order to assure stability. This, of course, would depend upon the context, 
 
60 Ackerman, Dworkin. Some secular liberals are perfectionists and thus permit the state to favor some 
conceptions of the good life over others. Raz, supra note 27, Part VI (1986). Even then, the perfectionist 
liberal typically favors a broad range of life styles so long as they are autonomously chosen. The favoring 
of autonomously chosen life styles over non-autonomous life styles need not lead to the view that the latter 
receive no protection, but they might well receive less weight in a constitutional balance, and they would 
not be encouraged by the state. Some perfectionists who identify as liberals place stress on diversity 
without privileging autonomy. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991). Other liberals emphasize 
the value of autonomy and diversity, but see this as part of the value of neutrality rather than an 
justification for perfectionism. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alan Ryan ed., ). 
61 RAINER FORST, CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEYOND LIBERALISM AND 
COMMUNITARIANISM 69 (John M. Farrell trans., 1994) (“A person’s religious conviction is worthy of 
protection because it is identity-determining, and not because it is religious.”). 
62 That is, they would favor religious over non-religious views.  For development of this argument, see 
Marshall, supra  note 8, A strong theme in the legal literature is that such accommodations tend to favor 
majority over minority religions. Stephen L. Carter, The Ressurection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV.
L.REV. 118, 122-23 (1993); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against 
Discretionary Accomodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L.REV. 555 (1991); James D. Gordon, Free Exercise 
on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L.REV. 108 (1991). 
63 For the argument that a contrary result in Smith would privilege faith over reason and that the American 
Constitution is an Enlightenment Constitution that favors reason over faith, see Suzanna Sherry, 
Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473, 477 (1996).  Sherry maintains that 
reason is at odds with faith, but I think she would search hard to find believers that concede this. Rather 
they might say that faith is a gift supported by or fully compatible with reason. Indeed, some religious 
traditions regard reason as an important source of religious understanding. 
64 Locke, supra not 37, at 236-37, 243. 
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but it is an argument that would appeal to those who are hostile to religion. For many of them, a 
primary purpose of religious protection is to prevent the instability that follows in the wake of 
passionately held views. On the other hand, one might wonder in Smith whether Native 
Americans were a significant threat to stability.  Perhaps, however, this is the wrong level of 
abstraction. Perhaps it is wrong to look at the particular threat of any individual group and right to 
be generally concerned in a post 9/11 era  that  restrictions on religion can lead to violent 
reaction.  
A secular liberal might also argue that the formalism of the Smith decision did not 
appropriately implement the value of equality.  It could be argued that the actors who put the state 
action into place in Smith did so without proper regard for the concerns of the religion involved 
even if they had no hostile purpose. A test for this type of discrimination might be to ask whether 
the law in question would have passed if it burdened a religious majority in the same way. This is 
the approach taken by Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager.65 It does not value speech over 
other forms of the good life,66 but it can lead to robust protection for the free exercise of religion. 
Finally, it might be thought especially cruel to require someone to act or not to act when 
their conscience or sense of moral obligation demands otherwise.67 The argument could be that 
such an approach does not assume that one form of the good life is better than another. Rather it 
assumes that some impingements on lives are worse than others. Indeed, one could think that a 
particular religion was preposterous while thinking that a burden imposed by law was especially 
harsh in individual cases. To be sure, from a secular perspective, one could not distinguish 
religious invocations of conscience from non-religious invocations of conscience. On the other 
 
65 Christoper L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional 
Basis for Proetecting Religious Conduct, 61 U.CHI. L.REV. 1245, 1285 (1994). [check page number] 
66 On the other hand, Eisgruber and Sager do not regard all liberties as alike. They maintain that deep 
commitments should be treated equally (id. at 1255) though it is not clear how they determine which 
commitments are deep. Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment, 2006 U.ILL.
L.REV. 571, 583-87 (2006). 
67 This would not cover many religious claims not based in conscience. Koppelman, note 66 supra, at 586. 
Indeed, important religious claims sometimes have nothing to do with voluntary actions of the claimants. 
David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L.REV. 769 
(1991). 
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hand, one might regard any invocation of conscience as “religious” regardless of whether the 
source of the obligation was thought to be based on a Supreme Being. 68 
On the other hand, some secular liberals, especially hostile liberals, might reject this 
whole line of argument. They might believe that the religious objector is simply another example 
of a person with expensive tastes who need not be catered to.69 Or they might think that the 
privileging of claims of conscience over other preferences in fact unfairly favors one version of 
the good life over another.70 In one sense this would be an odd position for most secular 
liberalisms to take. Secular liberalisms are typically and unmistakably moral theories with moral 
premises. Nonetheless, they balk at permitting the state to promote particular moral theories. On 
the other hand, secular liberalisms frequently find room to recognize the particular force of claims 
of conscience.71 Indeed, typically because of respect for freedom of conscience, many secular 
liberals regard freedom of religion as an important basic liberty.72 
That said, secular liberalism (whatever the private views of its adherents) ordinarily does 
not regard religion as especially valuable. Religion is simply one form of the good life or bad life, 
one form of autonomous choice, one exercise of liberty, basic or otherwise, that deserves to be 
respected. On these premises, there remain grounds why secular liberals would want to protect 
religious liberty along with other liberties. It might also be clear why religion might be singled 
out in the Establishment Clause. In addition, to avoiding the marking of outsiders and insiders, 
the secular liberal might fear violent struggles over capture of the state by one religion over 
 
68 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)(conferring conscientious objector status to someone who 
declared a “religious faith in a purely ethical creed”)[page number?] 
69 Barry, note 8 supra at 34-35; Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 26, at 154-55 
(comparing the religiously intolerant to the person with expensive tastes). 
70 Check Eisgruber and Sager 
71 Of course, it can be argued that state neutrality is a moral requirement. 
72 Unlike garden variety liberties, a basic liberty may not be denied unless it interferes with another’s 
freedom (Kant), or compromises another’s “basic liberty” (Rawls) or “right” (Dworkin) or “harms the 
interests of others,” (Mill), and even then a further showing would ordinarily need to be made. Freedom of 
religion in this respect would occupy the same plane as other basic liberties. One of the problems for 
liberals is to explain how to distinguish garden variety liberties from more important liberties or rights. 
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another. But the fear that the use of religious symbols by the state such as the crèche in Allegheny 
County or numerous other uses of religious symbols by the state seems excessively fearful.  
In the absence of that, secular liberalism has a hard time explaining why religion alone is 
subject to an Establishment Clause. If equality is the only basis for the Establishment Clause, if 
free exercise is guaranteed, and if religion is simply one of many forms of equal liberty, what is 
the justification for singling out religion as one of the rare types of speech in which government 
can not engage? I do not think secular liberalism has a satisfactory answer to this question.73
Religious liberalism’s approach to free exercise issues overlap those of the secular liberals. 
It too can be concerned about instability and discrimination. But it does not view religious 
practice to be simply one of many forms of the good life. It regards religious liberty to be 
particularly valuable although it need not endorse particular practices that it believes should be 
protected.  This does not mean that religious liberals believe that all religious practices should be 
protected. Rather the claim would be that freedom of religion should be interpreted broadly: that 
religious burdens imposed even by non-discriminatory laws be scrutinized with special care and 
that the state should intervene to require religious accommodations for those burdened by non-
governmental action. With respect to establishment issues, religious liberalism moves beyond 
concerns of liberty, equality and stability. Religious liberalism agrees that separation of church 
and state furthers liberty, equality, and promotes stability. Unlike secular liberalism, religious 
liberalism believes that religious liberty is particularly important and it would protect and 
separate religion from associations with government on the ground that tight connections with 
government are bad for religion. Secular liberalism either has no resources to make this 
contention or, worse, it suggests that the argument should not be made. Thus, the dominant strain 
of secular liberalism maintains that robust religion in the public square will interfere with the 
autonomy of the state, undermine the public interest, and create a legitimacy deficit. So, against 
 
73 Secular liberalism’s best escape from this problem is to condemn government pronouncements on the 
good life generally whether of not religious in character. But this escape route leads to a minefield. See 
paragraph accompanying note 75 infra. 
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religious conservatives, the dominant strain maintains that it is wrong for them to introduce their 
views in the public sphere. By contrast, religious liberals argue that religious conservatives do no 
wrong in introducing their views in the public sphere. What is wrong with religious conservatives 
is that they have bad politics and bad theology. My view is the politics of religious liberalism are 
more promising than those of secular liberalism. 
III. The Politics of Liberalism 
A. Secular Liberalism 
Secular liberals are on the defensive in American politics, and cases involving governmental 
displays of symbols are good vehicles for seeing why that would be the case. In Van Orden, 
Justice Breyer maintained that ordering the removal of a religious display would show hostility 
toward religion.74 That claim has substantial power in American rhetorical and political life. It 
poses an especially difficult problem for secular liberals. With respect to hostile liberals, the 
claim of hostility, at least with respect to organized religion, is quite true. Though anti-religious 
rhetoric employed against a corrupt church has often been politically helpful in the European 
context, it is less effective in the American context. To be sure, criticism of the religious right is a 
powerful organizing tool in the Democratic Party, and many independents are not allies of the 
religious right. But there is a substantial political difference between attacking the religious right 
and being hostile to organized religion generally. An American politician who announces her 
hostility to religion, organized or not, is an office holder forging a quick path to the private sector.  
 
74 125 S.Ct. at 2871. He cast the decisive vote in the case in part because he was concerned about 
divisiveness. Id. This has been met with substantial criticism. “Quelling public strife has been the Holy 
Grail or, perhaps more aptly, the siren song of religious liberty jurisprudence. . . . I submit that suggestions 
of this kind are both misplaced and quixotic: They are misplaced because we betray our constitutional 
aspirations if we compromise our commitment to equal membership in exchange for a bit more serenity, 
and they are quixotic because no Establishment clause doctrine will stop religious groups from bickering 
with one another in the public sphere.” Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and 
the Value of Equal Membership, 74 FORDHAM L.REV. 2177 (2006); See also William Van Alstyne, Ten 
Commandments, Nine Judges, and Five Versions of One Amendment – The First (“Now What”), 14 WM &
MARY BILL RTS.J. 17, 25 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. 
Perry, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J., 1 (2005). But see Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court,
119 HARV. L.REV. 31, 100 (2004)(agreeing with Breyer on the divisiveness concern). 
 
17
Most hostile liberals, of course, will not put forth their hostility to religion as the basis for 
removal of a religious display. Like other secular liberals, they will argue that the state should be 
neutral about the good life. In the American political context, this too will fall on deaf ears. 
Neutrality liberalism has never been practiced in the United States. Subsidies for the arts favor 
one view of the good life over another. Dworkin offered a hair splitting set of arguments to the 
effect that this was not so,75 but few voters would have been impressed. In addition, public 
education has consistently disfavored some views of the good life over others. The autonomous 
choice to make selfish hedonism and masochism the center of one’s life may be honored by 
neutrality liberalism, but it would be discouraged in any public school. Neutrality liberalism is not 
only a political non-starter, but would equally arouse suspicions of religious hostility. Tearing 
down religious displays in the name of neutrality is likely to be experienced as an act of hostility 
covered up in neutrality dress. If Martin Luther King’s I Have a Dream speech can be placed on a 
monument, but the Ten Commandments can not, what is the neutrality explanation? Hostile and 
Indifferent liberals might argue that these remarks do not refute either form of liberalism; indeed 
they would suggest that the lack of political appeal of either form of liberalism in the United 
States only shows how far the United States is from being a just society. I do not claim to have 
refuted either form of liberalism here. I have only tried to maintain that they are not yet politically 
attractive options in the American context. 
By contrast, as I have suggested, religious liberals can effectively argue that religious 
displays are politically and theologically unsound. Before exploring this, we should consider the 
objections of secular liberals particularly those of John Rawls to this argumentative path.  
B. Public Reason 
The doctrine of public reason put forth by cooperative liberals in its narrow version is that 
 
75 Ronald Dworkin, Can a Liberal State Support Art?, in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 221 
(1985). 
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those citizens who participate in the public political forum,76 at least with respect to constitutional 
essentials and questions of basic justice,77 should not argue on the basis of comprehensive 
views,78 but should instead employ premises that can be shared by all reasonable citizens seeking 
to establishing fair terms of cooperation.79 Although comprehensive views could be mentioned 
only in rare cases in the narrow view, John Rawls in later writing moved to the broader view that 
we could “introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or 
nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the 
principles and public policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.”80 On either the 
narrow view or the broader view, Rawls maintained that, “Central to the idea of public reason is 
that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except 
insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic 
polity.”81 Thus, religious conservatives could be criticized in the public political forum to the 
extent their doctrine was “incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic 
polity,” but not on the grounds that they employed bad theology. 
Rawls never maintained that these restrictions applied with the force of law. They were 
understood to be a “duty of civility,”82 a part of our understanding of what it means to be a good 
and reasonable citizen. Nor were these restrictions intended to apply throughout the society. In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls was understood to mean that the doctrine of public reason applied to 
political utterances about constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice addressed to the 
 
76 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 30, at 215. I focus on John Rawls’s writings because 
they have been the most influential and because they have tried to justify the doctrine in the circumstances 
where Rawls believes they are strongest. Id.at 215. I also focus on his later writings because they represent 
his most mature views. 
77 Id. at 214. 
78 Id. at 224-25. 
79 Id. at 224. The strong version even posits that controversial scientific (I assume including social science) 
positions may not be introduced in determining either constitutional essentials or principles of basic justice, 
or how they should be applied. Id. 
80 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U.CHI.L.REV. 765, 776 (1997). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 769. 
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citizens at large.83 In later writing, Rawls either changed or clarified his position. He argued that 
the doctrine included the discourse on the same kinds of questions by judges, government 
officials, candidates for public office, and their campaign managers “especially in their public 
oratory, party platforms, and political statements.”84 Citizens on Rawls’s account, “fulfill their 
duty of civility and support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold public 
officials to it.”85 But political discussions on issues of basic justice and constitutional essentials in 
the background culture, including the media and universities were not subject to the restrictions 
of public reason86 whether or not they were addressed to the public at large.87
According to Rawls, the doctrine of public reason implements a form of civic friendship,88 
an ideal of citizenship in which citizens justify fundamental arrangements in ways that others as 
free and equal can acknowledge as reasonable and rational.89 Public reason is needed, argues 
Rawls, to secure legal legitimacy90 and a stable society. 91 In my view, however, the doctrine of 
public reason unnecessarily flees from politics.  
The doctrine has an aesthetic symmetry. All comprehensive visions are treated alike: not of 
them can justify a decision on a constitutional essential or basic question without undermining 
legitimacy and stability. But all comprehensive visions are not alike.92 Suppose that a 
constitutional essential with respect to freedom of speech is decided with explicit resort to 
 
83 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 30, at 215: “[T]he ideal of public reason does hold for 
citizens when they engage in political advocacy in the public forum.” Indeed, he was interpreted to mean 
that the doctrine of public reason applied to political discussions on these issues not addressed to the public 
at large. See David Hollenbach, S.J., Civil Society: Beyond the Public-Private Dichotomy, 5 THE 
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 15 (Winter 1994/1995), cited in Rawls, Public Reason, note 80 supra, at 768 
n.15. 
84 Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 80, at 767. 
85 Id. at 769. 
86 For a nuanced discussion of the varying contexts in which the limits of public reason should or should 
not apply, see KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASON (1995). For a partial 
critique, see Steven H. Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L.J. 1631 (1999).  
87 Rawls, supra note 80 at 768. 
88 Id. at 771. 
89 Rawls, supra  note 30, at 217. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 390-92. 
92 Note on Robert Audi. 
20
Kantian premises or a significant freedom of press issue by explicit reasoning from 
comprehensive utilitarian premises. Surely, such decisions would not risk instability in a country 
like the United States, nor is it easy to see they would be deemed illegitimate. In other words, it is 
unclear that one would find more problematic a decision based on Kantianism or comprehensive 
utilitarianism than a decision based on value weighing without resort to comprehensive views that 
seemed insensitive, so much so that the former would be considered illegitimate.93 
One’s reflective intuitions might well be different if the rationale for a constitutional 
essential were based on theological premises, but that does not justify ruling out constitutional 
essentials based on other comprehensive visions. It simply demands an explanation as to why 
religion is special. Why is it that secular comprehensive visions do not raise legitimacy concerns, 
but religious comprehensive visions do? I suspect that what is really driving the doctrine of public 
reason is fear about the instability effects of religion and that the entire apparatus has been set up 
with that concern lurking in the background. At the risk of euphemism, it is fair to say that much 
European history supports such a concern.94 American history from the abolitionist movement to 
the Progressive movement to the Civil Rights movement to the modern Religious Right, however, 
is a different story. The exclusion of comprehensive views has never been a part of American 
 
93 Cooperative liberals insist, however, that restrictions are necessary to achieve political consensus based 
on shared premises. This may be true. But this assumes a political consensus is in the cards. Political 
consensus among millions of citizens is a rare event. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject What 
Liberalism Tells Us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons, in RELIGION AND 
CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 162, 174 (Paul J. Weithman, ed., 1997)(“There’s no more hope that all 
among us who are reasonable and rational will arrive, in the way Rawls recommends, at consensus on 
principles of justice, than that we all, in the foreseeable future, will agree on some comprehensive 
philosophical or religious doctrine.”); Cf. Marci A. Hamilton, What does Religion Mean in the Public 
Square?, 89 MINN. L.REV. 1153, 1157 (2005)(not clear that all important controversies can be resolved in 
this way). The exclusions seem designed not to achieve consensus, but to channel the character of the 
disagreement. 
 
94 Rawls refers more than once to religious wars in Europe. Perhaps I am too cynical or have too many 
Marxist bones in my body, but I believe that much governmental action done in the name of religion has 
been a cover for economic advantage. European governments may have said they fought wars in the name 
of one religion or another; they may have said that they colonized in the interests of educating the 
uncivilized and spreading Christianity. Religion may well have been a contributing factor, but it is way too 
fast to look to religion as the major cause of instability. And, may I say, anyone who thinks that President 
Bush’s belief in Jesus Christ had anything to do with American entry into the Iraq war knows nothing of 
American politics. 
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history.95 American free speech doctrine expresses what the Court has called “our profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited robust 
and wide-open.”96 There is no exception for religious speech either in law or culture. This history 
does not reveal the instability that supposedly warrants the exclusion of religion from public 
reason.97 
The same point applies to that part of the doctrine of public reason that limits criticism of 
opposing comprehensive doctrines.98 At least from the vantage of Rawls’s early writing, this 
doctrine would limit the ability of religious liberals to criticize the comprehensive vision of 
religious conservatives in the public sphere. In part, the point appears to be that such criticism 
would not show proper respect. But any argument from respect would conflate the need to respect 
persons with a supposed need to respect positions.99 A Millian can respect a Kantian while 
disagreeing with his comprehensive views. Moreover, the narrow version of the argument fails to 
recognize that a Kantian might learn from a Millian who advances her comprehensive views in 
the public sphere. So too Millians and Kantians might learn from Christians or Jews.100 Similarly, 
 
95 Hamilton, supra note 93, at 1158 (“[T]here has never been a time in the United States when religion has 
not been a driving force behind public policy . . . .”). 
96 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
97 Cf. Philip L. Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious, 69:2 PROCEEDINGS AND 
ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION  35 (no dangerous conflict despite the use of 
religious arguments on a massive scale). We have survived with a modus vivendi and that is all we have 
needed; Robert Merrihew Adams, Religious Ethics in a Pluralistic Society 93, 102-07 in PROSPECTS FOR A 
COMMON MORALITY (Gene Outka & John Reeder, Jr., eds., 1993). For concerns about instability stemming 
from religious intolerance, see Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.CHI. L. REV. 195, 
197 (1992). 
98 See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
99 Gutmann and Thompson, who are committed to mutual respect and the principle of reciprocity, 
recognize the need to resort to general philosophical and moral considerations when mutually agreeable 
premises are not available to resolve disputes. AMY GUTTMAN & DENNIS THOMSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT 76 (1998). 
100 As David Tracy has argued, public reason is not just about arguments; public reason is about 
conversation. Conversation in Tracy’s sense can take place between a citizen and a work of art or a classic 
in a religious tradition. The classic in a particular tradition communicates a universal message. That 
message is not static. As Gadamer maintains, it must be interpreted in terms of the different horizons of 
time and place. Just as Ralph Waldo Emerson repeatedly emphasized the extent to which the universal is to 
be found in the particular, so work such as the Bible may communicate a message that has force outside a 
particular religious tradition. Even if that is not the case on particular subjects, citizens learn more about 
each other if they understand what is important to them. But they can not learn about each other if they can 
not advance their comprehensive position in public life. 
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it would be hard to show that criticism of comprehensive views has been historically excluded 
from the public forum.  
 If comprehensive views have routinely been a part of the political public forum, the public 
reason doctrine certainly does not describe American politics. If the point of public reason theory 
is to design a utopia for an imaginary pluralistic society without any hope of political 
implementation, then claims of political infeasibility would miss the mark. But the public reason 
doctrine has been developed with more ambition than that. Can it be held up as a regulative ideal? 
The problem with this suggestion is that movement toward the ideal would be counterproductive. 
This conclusion also follows from the fact that arguments from comprehensive views have 
always been part of the public dialogue, and there is no reason to believe that will ever change. 
To try to take a step toward the utopian public forum by self censorship of your own 
comprehensive views will not produce followers from your adversaries; it will simply leave the 
field open to them.101 If the religious right is in the public forum, it needs to be attacked not 
because it violates the strictures of public reason, but because it embraces bad politics and bad 
theology. 102 
Has Rawls successfully responded to these criticisms by (1) expanding the extent to which 
comprehensive visions may be introduced in the public forum103 and (2) narrowing the venues in 
which the doctrine of public reason applies?104 Allowing comprehensive visions to be freely 
introduced into the public forum certainly responds to the criticism that citizens can not really 
understand their fellow citizens without knowing where they are coming from. It also brings the 
 
101 See Quinn, supra note 97, at 50 (only liberals would be tempted to accept the obligations of public 
reason). 
102 After some earlier attempts to defend a middle ground position, see Michael J. Perry, LOVE AND POWER:
THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 99-100, 139-41 (1991), this is the 
conclusion endorsed by Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: FurtherThoughts-And 
Second Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L.REV. 716 (1993). See also Sanford Levinson, 
Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARVARD L.REV. 2075, 2077 (1992)(accord); Shiffrin, 
supra note 86 (accord). For a middle ground position, see Robert Justin Lipkin, Reconstructing the Public 
Square, 124 CARDOZO L.REV. 2025 (recommending that some forms of religious argument be considered 
inappropriate in the public square). 
103 See text accompanying note 80. 
104 See text accompanying notes 84 to 87. 
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doctrine closer to the realities of American politics. But it does not get close enough. On the 
Rawls revision, the doctrines are introduced not for persuasive purposes, but merely for 
informative purposes. But this too is utopian and also can not serve as a regulatory ideal for the 
same reasons rehearsed earlier. Religious conservatives are introducing their comprehensive 
visions into public life for persuasive purposes, not just to tell us where they are coming from. 
The same is true of religious progressives.  
The restriction of venues where public reason is to apply is somewhat more complicated. I 
would put on the utopian side the insistence that citizens enforce the doctrine of public reason in 
their voting. This does not happen and will not happen. Also, I very much doubt that a Kantian 
legislator or a utilitarian legislator would be remotely deterred from saying so in public utterances 
unless particular political circumstances happened to dictate otherwise. On the other hand, the 
Establishment Clause may well put limits on what a government legislator can say about religious 
purposes in some circumstances. Certainly a legislature could not say that it had religious 
purposes in passing an act (though it could have Kantian purposes), nor could a court responsibly 
live up to its oath in supporting the Constitution and give religious reasons for a decision. 
On the other hand, Rawls’ revised views permit opinion and will formation to take place in 
civil society. That formation may well be influenced by religion. If Rawls supposed that 
legislators are going to ignore public will because it has been formed by the introduction of 
religious comprehensive views, he was supposing ideal legislators who for the most part do not 
exist.  
 More significant, Rawls’ revision permits criticism of comprehensive views in civil 
society from the print, broadcast, and blog media to the universities, but apparently prohibits such 
criticism by political leaders and judges. One could quibble over aspects of this, but the main 
point is that the retreat of Rawls here opens the field to effective criticism of comprehensive 
views in most aspects of the public forum. For those who think that, “Central to the idea of public 
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reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or 
nonreligious  . .  .,”105 it seems that Rawls’ revision took the fangs out of this central aspect. In 
truth, the choice for Rawls was bleak. Either argue for an unrealistic utopia or for a more realistic 
doctrine with a scope so limited that the vision of a cooperative citizenry was seriously 
compromised. 
 It bear emphasizing, however, that religious liberals agree with Rawls that government may 
not use religious reasons in justifying legislation (for example, in whereas clauses or legislative 
reports) even though citizens and legislators may have been influenced by religious reasons.106
Government must supply fully adequate secular reasons for its actions in order to avoid violating 
the Establishment Clause. This puts considerable pressure on legislators not to give religious 
reasons for legislation107 though it need not do so for citizens and it puts no special obligation 
upon citizens to enforce public reason regarding legislators.  
 A final objection to the introduction of religious arguments in the public square is that it is 
futile: Religion is a “conversation stopper.”108 But this claim is also politically inept. It imagines a 
conversation between an atheist and a religious fundamentalist who invokes the Bible. 
Unwittingly, it partly plays on the stereotype of an ignorant and stupid atheist who has not read 
the Bible and would not understand it if he did (somehow it would be “inaccessible”).109 
Moreover, it assumes that the fundamentalist stubbornly adheres to a particular interpretation and 
can not be moved by argument. I do not wish to do deny that there are atheists who have not read 
the Bible. I would deny that they have some special inability to comprehend what they read. I do 
 
105 See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
106 I do not believe that this calls upon legislators to be deceptive. There is a difference between being 
deceptive and not engaging in full disclosure. Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 139, 165; Steven D. Smith, 
Augustinian Liberal 74 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 1673, 1683  (1999)(accord). Moreover, from at least one 
religious perspective, the inability to engage in full disclosure is consistent with the understood conflict 
between the kingdom of God and the kingdom on earth. See id. at 1684-89. 
107 This assumes that legislative history is relevant to determining the purposes of a statute. 
108 Richard Rorty, Religion as a Conversation-Stopper,” 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 2  (1994). 
109 The inaccessibility argument posits a citizen who claims to be following the directions of an angel who 
appeared to him. Arguments in the public forum are rarely of this type, and if introduced in a public forum, 
it would not likely be effective. 
25
not deny that stubborn, close-minded fundamentalists exist in substantial numbers. But the notion 
that fundamentalists or evangelicals (they are not the same) can not be persuaded on theological 
issues is untenable. Indeed, one of the most important changes in American politics involved 
persuading religious conservatives to abandon a fundamental aspect of religious doctrine. 
For most of the last century, millions of conservative Protestants adhered to a strict 
interpretation of the doctrine of two kingdoms. Believing that the kingdom of God was not of this 
world, these Protestants stayed out of American politics.110 But Jerry Falwell and other 
conservative Christians argued on theological and political grounds that, properly interpreted, the 
Bible demanded political participation, not political quietism.111 The face of American politics 
changed significantly.112 
Ninety per cent of Americans believe in God.113 I would guess that the overwhelming 
majority of them are not theologically sophisticated. Moreover, I would argue that millions of 
religious people are open-minded on a broad range of subjects. A large majority of American 
Catholics, for example, reject some Vatican teachings,114 and by implication, the Vatican’s move 
to the doublespeak position that freedom of conscience means Catholics must submit to Vatican 
teachings.115 This does not mean that Christians can be easily persuaded to become Jews or vice 
 
110 ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER & ALLEN D. HERTSKE, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE,
AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 38-39 (1995). 
111 Evangelicals were not united on this score. Bob Jones called Jerry Falwell “the most dangerous man in 
America.” Id. at 39. 
112 Until the 1970’s, the main religious lobbies in the United States were liberal. See MICHAEL CORBETT &
JULIA MITCHELL CORBETT, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES 97 (1999). 
113 Harris Interactive, The Religious and Other Beliefs of Americans 2003, THE HARRIS POLL #11, Feb 11, 
2003, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=359 (last visited August 20, 2006). 68 
per cent believe in the Devil and 69 per cent believe in hell. Id. 
114 ANDREW GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC REVOLUTION: NEW WINE, OLD WINESKINS, AND THE SECOND 
VATICAN COUNCIL 34-40 (2004).  
115 Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Veritas Splendor stated that the magisterium “teaches the faithful 
specific particular precepts and requires that they consider them in conscience morally binding.” PAULINUS 
IKECHUKWU ODOZOR, C.S.SP., MORAL THEOLOGY IN AN AGE OF RENEWAL 316 (2003). Although there is 
precedent for this view in the Catholic tradition, there is a counter tradition that makes it the right and the 
duty of Catholics to follow their conscience when it is contrary to the magisterium. RICHARD MCBRIEN,
CATHOLICISM 972-75 (New ed. 1994). For exploration of the two editions, see LINDA HOGAN,
CONFRONTING THE TRUTH: CONSCIENCE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION (2001); CONSCIENCE: READINGS IN 
MORAL THEOLOGY NO. 14 (Charles Curran ed., 2004). Even if the former view of conscience is accepted, 
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versa, but a wide variety of political issues fit in indeterminate ways in most religious 
frameworks. They can and do provoke dialogue between and among religious traditions. 
Although Richard Rorty might be conversationally stopped by religious dialogue,116 religious 
debate with political implications is a standard feature of American political life. It seems vastly 
counterintuitive that liberals should refuse to join that dialogue. 
To be sure, for many it will seem disappointing to give up on public reason. It seems for 
them to assure illegitimacy. But this form of illegitimacy is dwarfed by far more serious forms of 
injustice. Indeed, injustice is a permanent feature of any large society. Large societies need 
hierarchies and those with power are often corrupt or see things in a biased way that operates to 
their advantage.  In addition, power in one hierarchy spills over to another. Money buys political 
favors. Distributive injustice is rampant. Environmental exploitation to the detriment of future 
generations is dangerously persistent. Elites have greater access to the media, and have 
substantial ability to paper over substantial injustice. In very complex ways, the media’s financial 
interest and various aspects of the American election system and its financing restrict the public 
agenda.  
In my view, the doctrine of public reason with its precious conception of respect, its inflated 
worries of instability, and its narrow emphasis on a particular aspect of legitimacy is a theory at 
war with the needs of progressive politics. Let me put it in a less inflammatory way. In Rawlsian 
terms, at least two conditions must be satisfied in order to achieve legitimacy. The limits of public 
reason must be respected. The principles of justice must be complied with. In my view, neither 
condition will ever be satisfied, but progress in satisfying the principles of justice is far more 
important than respecting the limits of public reason. John Rawls came close to acknowledging 
 
there are technical questions as to what counts as a teaching of the magisterium or as levels of authority 
within the magisterium. See generally MAGISTERIUM AND MORALITY (Readings in Moral Theology, No 3) 
(Charles E. Curran, ed., 1981). 
116 See note 108 supra. 
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this in Political Liberalism when he observed that it was appropriate for the abolitionists117 and 
Martin Luther King118 to depart from the limits of public reason. Generously read, I think he 
might be understood to maintain that it was appropriate for the abolitionists and Martin Luther 
King not only to argue from their comprehensive position, but also against the comprehensive 
position of their opponents.  This concession of Rawls, however, was too limited. By using the 
examples of slavery and segregation, he encouraged the view that one might depart from public 
reason in only rare instances. But the extent of injustice and the pervasive departures from public 
reason in the public realm should make departures from the limits of public reason appropriate 
whenever it would advance other principles of justice to do so.119 Second, Rawls argued that the 
arguments of abolitionists and Martin Luther King were acceptable because they would 
strengthen adherence to the limits of public reason in the long run.120 This strikes me as whistling 
in the dark. Departures from the limits of public reason legitimize further departures from the 
limits of public reason.  If the notion is that limits on public reason will be more understandable 
when we reach an otherwise just society, I adhere to my view that we will never achieve a just 
society.  
We can do better. But the doctrine of public reason just gets in the way. 
 
B. Religious Liberalism 
Christian conservatives would have to get up very early in the morning to suggest that wars, 
let alone unilateral wars, ¼ of American children living in poverty, corporate materialism and 
power, the destruction of the environment, and the torture of human beings are consistent with 
biblical teachings. It is hard to get a message of war, torture, and ignoring the poor out of the 
 
117 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 30, at 249. 
118 Id. at 250. 
119 For the claim that the exception for abolitionists and for Martin Luther King would stimulate many 
others to think that they are similarly excepted, see Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 
94 COLUM.L.REV. 1936, 1944  (1994). 
120 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 30, at 251. 
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Sermon on the Mount. What about religion and the state?  
On the question of free exercise, religious liberals and religious conservatives share common 
ground. Indeed, religious liberals are closer to religious conservatives on this issue than to many 
on the left. Smith, after all was an easy case that was wrongly decided. It involved Native 
Americans ingesting peyote as a part of a religious ceremony. And the Court held that no 
religious issue was even implicated. The left with its historical concern for the plight of minorities 
has an easy time in opposing Smith. But the world of free exercise does not stop with Smith, and 
religious conservatives are more likely to weigh religion heavily than many on the secular left. In 
any event, religious liberals and religious conservatives are unlikely to divide over issues of free 
exercise on a systematic basis.  
When confronting the use of religious symbols by government, however, religious liberals 
share common ground with secular liberals. Outside museums and the like, they believe that 
liberal principles condemn government’s use of religious symbols. They share the view that 
government sponsorship of religious views unfairly discriminate.121 In the case of the Ten 
Commandments, as previously mentioned, such sponsorship violates equality. It does not does 
not show appropriate respect122 for agnostics, atheists, Buddhists,123 and Hindus.124 But religious 
liberals advance arguments that are more likely to speak to religious moderates and conservatives.  
Religious liberals maintain that government sponsorship of religious symbols is bad for 
religion. Government sponsorship can compromise the meaning of otherwise religious symbols, 
do little to advance religion, and can undermine the perceived and actual integrity of religious 
 
121 See text accompanying notes 51 to 53 supra.  
122 It also discriminates between Jews, Catholics, and various Protestant denominations. See text 
accompanying notes 130 to 137 infra. 
123 On Buddhist life and thought in the United States, see DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA ch. 4, 
142-221 (2001); ROBERT WUTHNOW, AMERICA AND THE CHALLENGES OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 47-56 
2005). 
124 On Hindu life and thought in the United States, see Eck, supra note 123, ch.3, at 80-141; Wuthnow, 
supra note 123, at 38-47.  
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groups.125 Religious liberals maintain that government ties with religion are bad for religion.  
In the eyes of religious liberals, the Constitution respects these concerns. Governmental 
affirmations of monotheism may be acceptable under the Constitution,126 but the protection of 
religion demands that further involvement of government with religion be cabined. From the 
perspective of the religious liberal, the question is not whether the Constitution favors religion (it 
does), but how the Constitution favors religion. And the Constitution largely favors religion by 
keeping government out of the way.  
First, and foremost, religious liberals believe that government should not be a theologian. It 
must not tell us what God has to say about any subject. To allow this would be to permit cynical 
and corrupt politicians use religion for political ends while favoring some religions over others. 
This is one of the reasons why government may not give religious reasons for legislation. And it 
also speaks to the heat of the abuses involved in the displays of the Ten Commandments. For 
example, in some translations, the Ten Commandments state that “You shall not covet your 
neighbor’s . . . male or female slave . . ., nor anything else that belongs to him.”127 The language 
is disturbing. It seems to approve property rights in human beings and it would seem to condemn 
efforts to rescue slaves from their owners. Neither in McCreary128 nor Van Orden129 did the 
government include this language in the display. But it seems deeply problematic for the state to 
decide what religious doctrines to endorse or not or to engage in a joint enterprise with a private 
party that has made the doctrinal choice. 
 
125 The attempt to argue that religious symbols like under God in the pledge of allegiance are not really 
“religious” is one example of pettifoggers at work.  
126 I refer here to practices such as placing “In God We Trust” on the currency and coins. For the argument 
that the constitutionality of these practices shows a constitutional commitment to monotheism, see  
Shiffrin, supra  note 18. But see Colby, supra note 18 (disputing this view). For a thoughtful attempt to 
define and limit practices such as these to be a de minimis exception, see Douglas Laycock, Theology 
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the 
Liberty, 118 HARV. L.REV. 155, 231-238 (2004). 
127 The New American Bible 75, translating Exodus,  20: 17 (1987).  
128 125 S.Ct. at 2728. 
129 125 S.Ct. at 2874. The translation used in Van Orden referred to a neighbor’s manservant or 
maidservant rather than a slave.  
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Equally serious, when the state displays the Ten Commandments, it must decide which 
version to post. Christians, Jews, and Muslims do not agree on the proper translation, and the 
different translations can make a difference.130 For example, the Catholic and most Protestant 
bibles say, “Thou [or You] shall not kill.”131 The Torah and the Lutheran Bible says, “You shall 
not murder.”132 The former version is an inspiration for Christian pacifists. In addition, the very 
choice of which biblical translation to pick represents a choice between religions. The different 
translations order the commandments differently, number the commandments differently, and, as 
we have seen, word the commandments differently. In McCreary133 and Van Orden134 the 
displays said “Thou shalt not kill,” siding with most Protestants and Catholics against Jews and 
Lutherans. In McCreary135 and Van Orden136 the wording of the Ten Commandments prohibited 
the making of graven images, a matter of dispute between Catholics and most Protestants that lay 
near the heart of the Reformation. 137 
130 Even if Christians, Jews, and Muslims were united, the displays discriminate against Hindus, Buddhists, 
atheists and agnostics among others. 
131 Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L.REV.
1477, 1489-90 (2005). 
132 Id. at 1489, 1491. 
133 125 S.Ct. at 2728. 
134 125 S.Ct. at 2874. The translation used in Van Orden referred to a neighbor’s manservant or 
maidservant rather than a slave.  
135 125 S.Ct. at 2728. 
136 125 S.Ct. at 2874. The translation used in Van Orden referred to a neighbor’s manservant or 
maidservant rather than a slave.  
137 The dispute over the wording of the Ten Commandments regarding graven images does not precisely 
line up Protestants against Catholics. On one side of the divide are Lutherans and Catholic. On the other, 
are Jews and the rest of the Protestant denominations including the Anglican community. DAIRMAID 
MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 145-46 (2003). The monument in Van Orden favored the 
Lutheran version. FInkelman, supra note 131, at 1486-87. In response to the arguments about the various 
translations, Justice Scalia argues in McCreary: “The sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not 
widely known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even aware that there are competing versions with 
doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not). In any event, the context of the display here could not 
conceivably cause the viewer to believe that the government was taking sides in a doctrinal controversy.” It 
is hard to understand why Justice Scalia thinks the government was not taking sides when it chose the King 
James version of the Ten Commandments in McCreary. Nor is it easy to understand the relevance of the 
undoubtedly correct assertion that most people are unaware of the textual difference in the Ten 
Commandment or the doctrinal disputes associated with them. If Justice Scalia, a Catholic, walked into a 
Texas courthouse and a Ten Commandments display said, “Though shall not murder,” he would quickly 
learn that the Catholic version was not on display. 
But the question in Establishment Clause law is not what Justice Scalia knows. It is what a 
hypothetical reasonable observer armed with all of the relevant facts would know and whether that 
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Apart from the discrimination, the Commandments cases contain features that no religious 
body should find appealing. In both cases the government parties attempted to argue that their 
purpose was secular.138 In McCreary, one of the earlier resolutions calling for a prominent display 
of the Commandments acknowledged Christ as the “Prince of Ethics.”139 The Commandments 
were then surrounded by other documents with a religious theme.140 After a court injunction 
against the display, the counties surrounded the Commandments with documents such as the Bill 
of Rights and the Declaration of Independence.141 The lawyers advising the counties presumably 
thought this might help cover over the religious purpose.142 But the Court emphasized that the 
purpose test was not a “pushover for any secular claim.”143 The idea that the Court should ignore 
the religious purpose so obviously present in earlier displays was cast aside: “[T]he world is not 
made brand new every morning.”144
Religion is not served by association with lawyers’ sleights of hand. Moreover, it is not clear 
how a government scripted abridged version of the Ten Commandments serves a religious 
purpose that a group need care about. In addition, it is hard to believe that the posting of an 
abridged version of the Ten Commandments in a court house actually influences moral behavior. 
What it can do is trigger resentment in those groups excluded by the language. This too is not a 
religious advance.  
Van Orden had most of these problems and more. The monument in that case had been 
 
knowledge would inform the observer that he or she was an outsider or an insider. For establishing purpose, 
this test makes sense. Suppose the Kentucky counties’ drew lots and picked the relevant text out of a hat. 
This would tell the reasonable observer that the counties were not endorsing one text over another. On the 
other hand, attributing knowledge an ordinary person is unlikely to have to a hypothetical observer is not 
appropriate if one is trying to determine the effects of a religious display. People entering courthouses with 
Ten Commandment displays in the absence of recent publicity are likely to know nothing about how the 
Commandments got there. The reasonable Jew will reasonably conclude that the Torah is not being 
employed because of the views of a religious majority reinforcing his or her outsider status.  
138 McCreary, 125 U.S. at 2732 (referring to counties’ claim that the purpose of the displays was secular);  
Van Orden, 125 U.S. at 2870 (referring to briefs of the United States and the State of Texas). 
139 125 S.Ct. at 2739. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2731. 
142 Id. at 2739-40. 
143 Id. at 2736. 
144 Id. 
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donated to the state more than forty years earlier by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.145 It contained 
the text of the Ten Commandments with two Stars of David below it and the superimposed Greek 
letters Chi and Rho which represent Christ146 together with a statement indicating that the 
monument had been donated to the state by the Eagles.147 
Judge E.J. Ruegemer, a Minnesota juvenile court judge and Chairman of the Eagles National 
Commission on Youth Guidance, initially came up with the idea of distributing paper copies of 
the Ten Commandments after encountering a juvenile offender who had never heard of them.148 
The Eagles themselves required a belief in God as a condition of membership.149 Cecil B. 
DeMille, who at the time was filming the movie called the Ten Commandments, heard of this and 
joined with the Eagles to produce the granite monolith in front of the Texas capital and others 
elsewhere.150 
Van Orden seems to present an unsatisfactory mix of religious and secular motives. The 
Eagles wished to combat juvenile delinquency by using the state to participate in their program of 
religious evangelism.151 Cecil B. DeMille’s motives may have been exactly the same, but it surely 
occurred to this astute businessman and showman, if it were not his primary motivation, that 
promoting memorials to the Ten Commandments promoted his film. It must have also occurred to 
the politicians who approved the memorial that the use of religious symbols might improve their 
political appeal. It can not be good for religion for its symbols to be used instrumentally for 
commercial and political gain.152 Even if crass motivation were not present, however, religions 
 
145 125 S.Ct. at 2858. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.  
148 125 S.Ct. at 2877 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 The religious purpose of the Eagles screams out from their presentation of the Ten Commandments. The 
words “I Am the Lord Thy God,” are in substantially larger print than the rest of the displayed text. 125 
S.Ct. at 2891 (Appendix to Stevens, J., dissenting opinion). The Commandments were referred to by the 
Eagles as the “foundations of our relationship with our Creator.” 125 S.Ct. at 2878 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
152 For the suggestion that commercial motivation should count in favor of the display, see Richard A. 
Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L.Rev. 31, 101  n.216 (2004). 
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that employ the state for evangelistic purposes risk dependency and backlash.153 
These are precisely the kinds of concerns that give religious liberals pause about financial 
aid to religious organizations. Pages of European experience are disturbing in this regard. The 
Catholic Church worked hard to secure privileges and funding in southern European countries. 
But it is hard to believe that the Catholic Church, for example, was helped by its ties with corrupt 
Kings, with Vichy France, Franco, Salazar, and Mussolini. This not only interfered with the kind 
of witnessing that was called for.154 It among other things put the Church on the wrong side of 
history in the eyes of millions of Europeans. 
 
There is a special appeal to conservatives in these kinds of arguments. An important strand 
of much conservative ideology has been to argue for freedom and against powerful government. 
 
153 Although Justice Breyer joined the majority’s opinion in McCreary, he thought the display in Van 
Orden met constitutional standards. Justice Breyer realized that the display communicated a religious 
message, but he thought a predominantly secular message predominated. He was impressed by the 
placement of the monument in a large park containing 17 monuments and 21 historical markers, all of them 
secular. He concluded that the setting contributed to the view that the message was primarily about a 
historical effort to tie the law to morals. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 11 (the closest other 
monuments were 30 feet away and blocked by hedges). The fact that a group (Breyer characterized it as 
primarily secular) contributed the monument to the state further distanced the state from the religious 
aspects of the message in his view. The forty year history of the monument without litigation suggested to 
him no serious objections had been taken. Any other conclusion in this case Justice Breyer argued would 
show hostility toward religion and lead to the kind of divisiveness the Establishment Clause was designed 
to forestall.  
This is not nonsense, but it is ultimately unpersuasive. The text of the Ten Commandments 
emphasized the religious aspects. The lettering of “I am the Lord thy God . . .” was substantially larger than 
the parts of the commandments compatible with secular morals. No theme tied the monuments together. 
The other monuments could not be seen from the area in front of the Ten Commandments. The memorial 
was sectarian. The “primarily secular” Eagles organization designed the memorial to combat juvenile 
delinquency (not as a history project) and  “recognized that there can be no better . . . program . . . than the 
laws handed down by God himself to Moses more than 3000 years ago . . . They are a fundamental part of 
our lives . . . the foundation of our relationship with our Creator.” The forty year history is not surprising 
since Establishment Clause claims are difficult (and would have been especially difficult forty years ago) 
and not financially rewarding. It provides no warrant for the proposition that the memorial was experienced 
by visitors as consistent with religious equality. As to hostility to religion and divisiveness, Justice Breyer 
does not explain how an emphasis on hostility or divisiveness can distinguish the Kentucky cases from the 
Texas case, how divisiveness can be avoided by any outcome, how judges are qualified to determine 
divisiveness in individual cases, or how it is consistent with their constitutional duties to decide such cases 
on the basis of such determinations.  
154 NICHOLAS ATKINS & FRANK TALLETT, PRIESTS, PRELATES AND PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN 
CATHOLICISM SINCE 1750, at 324 (2003) (explaining that, in return for benefits from the state, the Church 
preached submission to the temporal authority though it practiced extensive charitable work). 
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Religious conservatives ordinarily are suspicious of government in a broad swath of areas. This is 
consistent with their Augustinian distrust of human beings.155 But they seem comfortable with 
government promoting religion. If conservatives can not trust government to handle welfare 
checks or education or housing, why would they trust government with the promotion of religion? 
It is doubtful that conservatives can justify being so distrustful of government in one set of cases, 
but not the other. Particularly from a biblical perspective, it would be difficult for religious 
conservatives to justify their selective trust and distrust of government.  
The role that religion should play regarding the state is much debated within Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish, Muslim traditions among others. To approach the question from a purely 
secular perspective is to miss much of intellectual interest and of political importance. Secular 
liberals can argue that government involvement with the state is bad for religion as well (indeed, 
John Rawls makes this argument),156 but the question of what is good or bad for religion 
ultimately drives one toward theology which is what secular liberals hope to avoid. My claim is 
that it is bad politics to avoid it. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the 2004 Presidential election,157 Democrats worried that the language of 
secular liberalism was ill designed to meet the religious sensibilities of the nation.158 But the long 
 
155 MacCulloch, supra note 137, at 107, 109 (referring to Augustine’s view of the worthlessness  of 
humanity). 
156 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 80, at 795-97. 
157 For an excellent brief review of the data involving the role of Christian conservatives in the 2004 
Presidential election, see Mark J. Rozell & Debasree Das Gupta, “THE VALUES VOTE”? MORAL ISSUES AND 
THE 2004 ELECTIONS, IN THE VALUES CAMPAIGN: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND THE 2004 ELECTIONS  (John 
C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, & Clyde Wilcox, eds. 2006). 
158 Consider Bruce Ledewitz, Up Against the Wall of Separation: The Question of American Religious 
Democracy, 14 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS.J. 555 (2005): “The political importance of religion in the 2004 
election lay not in the mere existence of those voting patterns, for patterns like them had existed before. 
The change lay in the intention of the Bush campaign to win the Presidential election by using these 
election patterns – an apparently successful strategy.” Whether the intention was unique – I doubt it – the 
public manifestation of that intention seemed to be a new development in modern Presidential 
campaigning. Despite the intent of Democratic politicians to be more open to religion, they continue to fare 
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term political solution is not simply to appear religious to voters159 or even to emphasize issues 
that appeal to religious voters. The long term struggle must go beyond the sound bytes of election 
campaigns and move to the communicative interactions of civil society. Even the explicit politics 
of church/state questions are most crucial at the local level. Questions about the relationship 
between church and state are not simply legal questions. For there to be a case, government 
(typically local government) has to do something that gives rise to a case. Whether government 
should do something that might give rise to an Establishment Clause issue is part of our daily 
local political struggles as religious conservatives press for a larger voice in the public square. In 
opposing these pressures, it is politically more effective to argue that conservative victories are 
bad for religion than to argue that they are bad for atheists, agnostics, or non-theistic religions.  
Even if secular liberals have the best political theory, and even if they believe religion is 
superstition, secular liberals need to stop defining those who are religious as the Other. They need 
to stop supposing that religion is synonymous with conservative.160 It is long past time to engage 
the theology of the religious right because bad theology leads to bad politics. 
 
badly in polls on this score. Only 29 per cent of Americans polled in August 2005 believed that the 
Democratic Party was friendly to religion. At the same time 45 per cent of Americans thought religious 
conservatives had too much power in the Republican Party. The Pew Research Center for the People and 
the Press, Religion A Strength And Weakness For Both Parties (August 30, 2005) (last visited August 21, 
2006). 
 
159 David Brooks, A Matter of Faith, at A19 (June 22, 2004)(Americans want to be able to see their leaders’ 
faith). 
160 For a brief survey of the religious left, see John A. Coleman, Left Behind: Who and Where is the 
Religious Left in the United States, 194 AMERICA 11 (April 24-May 1, 2006). 
